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Abstract—Recognition-based graphical passwords are one of
several proposed alternatives to alphanumerical passwords for
user authentication. However, there has been limited work on
the security of such schemes. Often authors state a possible
attack combined with a proposed countermeasure, but the
efficacy of the counter measure is not always quantitatively ex-
amined. One possible attack which has been discussed without
examination of the efficacy is an intersection attack. If we can
establish which countermeasures for this attack are effective
then it will be possible to select the appropriate countermeasure
for the level of security required by a given system providing
more insight into the security of these schemes.
Our approach involved creating a simulation of intersection
attacks using each of five possible counter measures. The
number of attacks which had to be performed before success
for each approach was noted and compared to a control where
no counter measure was implemented.
Our results show that for three of the five countermeasures
there was a significant increase in the number of attacks before
success, one showed a significant decrease and the other did
not show any statistical significance. We show that it is not
decisive that using dummy screens when an incorrect image is
selected will increase the number of attacks required. We also
show that increasing the number of challenge screens reduces
the number of attacks required before success as the number
of challenge screens approaches the size of the passimage set.
Our results allow a more educated selection of what type of
countermeasure one should implement if they wish to reduce
intersection attacks.
Keywords-recognition-based graphical passwords, authenti-
cation, intersect attacks, simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
When considering alternatives for user authentication,
recognition-based graphical passwords are often discussed
(e.g. [2],[3],[4],[7]). Analysis of the level of security has
been discussed on in terms of some of the possible attacks
and potential countermeasures e.g. [1]. Whilst this is useful,
it would be beneficial to gather numerical data for the
proposed counter measures. To combat this, we propose an
approach of simulations to analyse how effective counter-
measures are against their related attacks. In this work we
apply this approach to an intersection attack.
For the purposes of this work, we define an intersection
attack as follows. An attacker aims to gain access to a user
account. The attacker starts the challenge session which
comprises of n challenge screens, each of which has one
passimage from the user’s passimage set (of size p) and a
number of distractors (d). The attacker attacks each screen in
turn by noting all the images on the screen (which refer to as
the challenge set) and incrementing a count of the number of
times each image has been viewed over all the attacks the
attacker has launched against this set of passimages. The
attacker then attempts to pass the challenge set by selecting
the image which has been viewed most frequently.
This is repeated for each challenge screen within the
session. If each image selected corresponds to the pas-
simages, then the attacker is successful and the process is
complete. If the attacker selects a distractor for any one of
the challenge screens, they must start a new attack. This
repeats until the attacker is successful. Once the attacker
has achieved successful authentication, the number of attacks
before success is reported. In the remainder of this paper, we
refer to the setup of a recognition-based graphical password
scheme as p−n−d, where p is the size of the passimage set,
n is the number of challenge screens in a challenge session
and d is the number of distractors per screen.
A number of countermeasures for intersection attacks
have been identified in research, these are discussed in
Section II. The aim of this research is to establish whether
these countermeasures increase the number of attacks before
successfully authenticating for a set of passimages. Addi-
tionally, we examine the effect of increasing the number of
distractors in countering an intersection attack. Our results
show three of the counter measures provide a significant
increase in the number of attacks which need to be attempted
before success, one countermeasure cannot be established as
having a significant effect on the number of attacks and the
other significantly reduces the number of attacks required.
II. THE COUNTERMEASURES
Dhamija and Perrig [7] successfully summarise counter
measures for intersection attacks as:
• Use the same distractor images and pass images for
each session.
• Repeat a small subset of distractor images for each
passimage. This would result in an attacker recording
the same frequencies for these distractors and the pas-
simage and the attacker would be unable to tell which
is the passimage. Thus, they would have to randomly
select one of the images with the same frequency of
occurrence.
• In any given challenge session, if a user selects a
distractor on a challenge screen, subsequent screens
only display distractor images - “dummy screens”.
• Implement a limit on the number of incorrect authenti-
cations a user can perform, this stops an impersonator
attempting to discover all of the images. (A “three
strikes and you’re out” approach)
The first approach where the distractors are set for a given
passimage will completely negate an intersection attack.
However, as Dhamija and Perrig note, reuse of distractor
images may result in users recognising the distractors and
selecting the wrong image for authentication [7] . Due to
this, we feel it is still worthwhile to examine the efficacy
of other countermeasures. In addition, as noted by Smith
[10, Page 163], there are “different secrets for different
uses”. That is to say, there are different levels of security
required for different environments. Thus it is feasible to
consider that one might not wish to go to the effort of
eradicating intersection attacks, but merely reduce the risk
to an acceptable level. This research aims to establish
how effective the different mitigation countermeasures are,
specifically the following were examined:
• Repetition of a subset of distractors for a given passim-
age
• Use of “dummy” screens if an attacker selects the
wrong image at any point within a session
• Using a passimage set which is larger than the number
of challenge screens in a session (proposed in [5] and
extended in [8])
Additionally, there has been no claim that increasing the
number of distractors shown per challenge screen or in-
creasing the number of challenge screens would mitigate
an intersection attack and so these were also examined for
significance. The hypotheses to be examined are reported in
the next section.
III. INTERSECTION ATTACK ALGORITHM
A collection of 144 images were used in the simulation,
the content of the images was unimportant as they were
selected randomly for both passimage sets and distractors,
minimising any potential effect on the results. The control
set up which involved no counter measures was as follows.
The first step was to generate a specified number of
passimages from the collection of all images. To create a
challenge session, the number of challenge screens to be
generated matched the number of passimages. A specified
number of distractors were then randomly selected from
the remaining images (the complete collection, less the
passimages for the current set of passimages) for each of
the challenge screens required.
An attack on the set of passimages was then conducted
as follows.
A list of images seen by the attacker is created. For each
challenge screen presented to the attacker, the images are
either added to the list of viewed images, or the number
of times they have been seen is incremented. To attack the
screen, the attacker takes the most viewed image on the
screen (the image on the screen with the highest count in
the list of viewed images) and selects that image as the
passimage. If the image is the passimage, a counter for the
number of screens passed in that session is incremented. If
at the end of the session, the number of screens passed is
equal to the number of challenge screens in a session,the set
of passimages was successfully attacked and the program
exits with the number of attacks which were attempted
before success (the dependent variable being examined in
this research). For each experimental set up (p− n− d and
any applicable countermeasure variables), this process was
run one hundred times.
IV. HYPOTHESES
The dependent variable being examined in this research
is the number of attacks before success. The independent
variables included the number of passimages in the user’s
passimage set (p), the number of challenge screens per
session (n), the number of distractors per challenge screen
(d), the number of distractors kept constant per passimage
and the use of dummy screens. The hypotheses to test
the relationships between the independent variables and
dependent variable were established as follows:
• H1 It takes significantly more attacks before a suc-
cessful intersection attack when there are a subset of
distractors kept constant between challenge sessions.
• H2 It takes significantly more attacks before a success-
ful intersection attack when the number of distractors
kept constant is increased.
• H3 It takes significantly more attacks before a suc-
cessful intersection attack when dummy screens are
presented if one screen in a challenge set is failed.
• H4 It takes significantly more attacks before a success-
ful intersection attack when a passimage set larger than
the number of challenge screens in a session is used.
• H5 It takes significantly more attacks before a success-
ful intersection attack when the number of challenge
screens in a session is increased.
• H6 It takes significantly more attacks before a success-
ful intersection attack when the number of distractors
per challenge screen is increased.
For hypothesis testing, where an independent variable is
being altered, the remaining independent variables are kept
constant so that the effect of only one independent variable
is being measured at any given time. We call the independent
variable being examined the experimental variable. The
corresponding null hypotheses (referred to by the hypothesis
number, with a subscript of 0 after e.g. the null hypothesis
for H1 is H10) detail that there is no significant difference in
the number of attacks before success. The control set up had
no countermeasures implemented and was used to compare
to the other configurations where each countermeasure was
implemented. A number of different variations were used to
test each hypothesis. For each hypothesis, the set ups used
were as follows:
A. H1 Experimental Set Ups
The number of distractors used were selected as eight,
nine and fifteen. This was to reflect common choices in
recognition-based schemes. Eight distractors are used in
passfaces (http://www.realuser.com/), nine distractors are
used in VIP [4] and fifteen distractors are used in the doodles
scheme [9]. The last size provided a comparison of a much
larger distractor set.
For this hypothesis, the number of images in the passim-
age set was kept consistent at four as was the number of
challenge screens. The number of distractors changed, but
hypothesis testing always compared a control configuration
with a corresponding configuration with only the experimen-
tal variable changed (in this case the number of distractors
kept constant per passimage) . For example the control of
no constant distractors with a configuration of 4-4-8 was
compared to one constant distractor per passimage with a
configuration of 4-4-8.
The experimental variable of “number of distractors kept
constant per passimage” was varied, using one distractor,
two and also three. This was varied to establish if the ex-
perimental variable had a significant effect on the dependent
variable (number of attacks before success). The values for
the experimental variable were selected as one, two and three
as all values had to be less than the number of distractors per
screen. If the number of constant distractors was equal to
the number of distractors per screen, no intersection attack
would be successful. In total for this hypothesis, nine set
ups were used, each of which was run 100 times.
B. H2 Experimental Set Ups
Three configurations were used to test the second hypoth-
esis. The counter measure of distractors being kept constant
was compared to an increased number of distractors kept
constant. As for H1, the number of distractors were eight,
nine and fifteen. For each of these, four challenge screens
and four passimages were used and three distractors kept
constant were compared to one distractor kept constant and
two distractors kept constant. Thus in total there were six
set ups each of which was run 100 times.
C. H3 Experimental Set Ups
To test the significance of using dummy screens, three
set ups were used, one for each of the values identified
for distractors (eight, nine and fifteen). The control set up
with four passimages, four challenge screens and each of the
distractor values was compared to the results for the dummy
screens countermeasure results with the matching number
of distractor values, number of passimages and challenge
screens giving a total of three configurations for hypothesis
testing.
D. H4 Experimental Set Ups
To test the significance of using a passimage set larger
than the number of challenge screens per session (thus
in any given session, a subset of the passimages is used)
six configurations were examined. 1.5 times the number
of passimages (six vs. four images with eight and nine
distractors ) in the set was examined, as was double the
number of passimages (four vs. eight with eight and nine
distractors), and triple the number of images in passimage
set (twelve passimages compared to four with four challenge
screens and eight and nine distractors). The number of
challenge screens was kept constant and eight and nine
distractors were used.
E. H5 Experimental Set Ups
To test the significance of increasing the number of chal-
lenge screens the number of passimages was kept constant
at ten. This value had to be large enough that the number
of screens was always less than the number of passimages
in the set, but the number of screens could be increased.
The distractors were kept constant at eight per screen and
the number of challenge screens was varied using values of
five, six, seven and eight.
F. H6 Experimental Set Ups
The final hypothesis required configurations which exam-
ined the effect of varying the number of distractors when
the number of challenge screens and number of passimages
was kept constant. Configurations with four passimages, four
challenge screens and eight distractors was compared to the
equivalent number of passimages and challenge screens but
with nine distractors and fifteen. Similarly, four passimages
and challenge screens with nine distractors was compared to
four passimages and challenge screens with fifteen distrac-
tors.
V. RESULTS
The histogram showing the distribution of one hundred
simulations for a control setting with four passimages, four
challenge screens and eight distractors is shown in Figure 1.
It can be seen from this figure that the distribution is skewed
to the right, indicating that the use of standard deviation and
mean may not be appropriate [6, Page 80]. The frequency
Figure 1. Control Histogram
distributions for the countermeasures configurations also
indicated asymmetric distributions. Examples for each of
these are provided in Figures 2, 3 and 4, some of which
appear more skewed than others (e.g. Fig. 2). The non-
normal distribution was also confirmed using a normal
probability plot (for the control configuration of 4-4-8), as
shown in Figure 5. In a normal probability plot, if the points
lie very close to the straight line which represents the normal
distribution, the data is normally distributed ([6, Page 115]).
Due to the asymmetric nature of the results, it was decided
that a statistical approach which was robust to outliers in
data and skewed distributions should be taken. We used the
Yuen statistic with 20% trimmed and an alpha value of 0.05,
as it is highlighted in [12, Page 157] that this approach
yields robust results. The Yuen test examines the hypothesis
that two independent groups have equal trimmed means
and tests the null hypothesis that two samples come from
the same distribution, this allowed us to examine whether
the counter measure configurations were statistically signif-
icantly different from the control configurations. The Yuen
test is used if the population size is small , has outliers and
the probability curve is non-normal [13]. Wilcox [12] has
written robust statistical functions for the statistical program
“R” http://www.r-project.org/. Thus for this analysis, this
program was used. In our hypothesis testing, if the Yuen
test statistic value was higher than the critical value (which
is automatically calculated by the R program for the data
input) then the null hypothesis was rejected (this is shown
in [11, Page 252]).
A. H1 - Constant Distractor Subset Results
A summary of the results for the use of constant distractor
subsets is demonstrated by the boxplot in Figure 6 where one
sees the effect of the number of distractors kept constant per
passimage on the number of attacks required before success
Figure 2. Subset of Constant Distractors Histogram
Figure 3. Dummy Screens Histogram
Figure 4. Larger Image Set Histogram
Figure 5. Normal Probability Plot
Figure 6. H1 Boxplot- Constant Distractors
Table I
CONSTANT DISTRACTORS SUMMARY STATS TABLE
No. of
Constant
Distrac-
tors
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
None 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.48 4.00 6.00
One 3.00 8.00 15.50 18.44 23.00 72.00
Two 3.00 23.50 60.50 73.33 103.80 365.00
Three 3.00 54.75 171.50 252.20 347.20 1454.00
for values 0 (control) ,1,2 and 3. It can be seen from this plot
that the use of a number of constant distractors reduces the
number of attacks required before success when compared
to zero constant distractors.
In each case represented in the plot, four challenge screens
with four passimages and eight distractors were used, the
experimental variable (the number of constant distractors
per passimage) was varied using zero, one, two and three.
The values for minimum, first quartile, median, mean, third
quartile and maximum for each set up is given in Table I
where it can be seen that the minimum stays approximately
equal in each case, but the values for median and the
quartiles increase between each value for constant distractors
. It should be noted that due to the skew of the distribution,
mean is not an accurate measure of spread, it is included for
completeness.
Applying the Yuen statistic with 20% trimmed means, the
null hypothesis H10 was rejected for each of the set ups used
to test H1 with the test statistic value ranging between 7.39
and 10.99 and the critical value as approximately 2.00 in
each instance. This means that the number of attacks before
success when a subset of distractors are kept constant is
significantly more (as indicated by the Figure 6) than that
when no distractors are kept constant.
Table II
DUMMY SCREENS SUMMARY STATS TABLE
Dummy Screens Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
No 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.48 4.00 6.00
Yes 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.70 4.00 6.00
B. H2 - Increasing the Number of Distractors Kept Constant
Results
A summary of the results for the use of constant distractor
subsets is demonstrated in Figure 6 when examining the
second and third and fourth boxes corresponding to one,
two and three distractors kept constant respectively. It can
be seen from this plot that increasing the number of constant
distractors increases the number of attacks required before
success. This is also shown in the statistics in Table I where
the values for median increase substantially between each
value. In each case here, four challenge screens with four
passimages and eight distractors were used, the variable of
interest (the number of constant distractors) was increased
from one to two and then to three.
Applying the Yuen statistic with 20% trimmed means,
the null hypothesis H20 was rejected for each of the set ups
used to test H2 with the test statistic value ranging between
4.84 and 8.16 and the critical value as approximately 2.00 in
each instance. This result is as expected from examination
of the evidence shown in the boxplot in Figure 6. This
means that increasing the number of distractors kept constant
per passimage significantly increases the number of attacks
before success.
C. H3 - Use of Dummy Screen Results
A summary of the results for the use of dummy screens
(upon incorrect selection) is demonstrated in Figure 7. It
can be seen from this plot that the use of dummy screens
when the attacker selects a distractor instead of a passimage
appears to have little effect on the overall number of attacks
required before success. In each case here, four challenge
screens with four passimages and eight distractors were
used. The experimental variable (the use of dummy screens)
was varied by either being used or not (when it wasn’t used,
this was the control configuration).
The values for minimum, first quartile, median, mean,
third quartile and maximum for each set up is given in
Table II. One can see from Table II that the only value
which changes between the control set up (using no dummy
screens) and the set up using dummy screens is the median,
which changes by 0.22. Thus the use of dummy screens
appears to show little evidence of an increase in the number
of attacks required before success.
Applying the Yuen statistic with 20% trimmed means,
confirmed that the null hypothesis H30 could not be rejected
for each of the set ups used to test H3 with the test statistic
value ranging between 0.79 and 1.70 and the critical value
as approximately 1.98 in each instance.
Figure 7. H3 Boxplot - Use of Dummy Screens Boxplot
Table III
LARGER PASSIMAGE SET SUMMARY STATS TABLE
No. of
Passim-
ages
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Four 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.48 4.00 6.00
Six 3.00 6.00 8.00 7.79 9.00 13.00
Eight 5.00 10.00 13.50 13.85 17.00 25.00
Twelve 7.00 38.75 48.00 49.62 62.25 96.00
D. H4 - Use of a Larger Image Set Results
A summary of the results for the use of larger passim-
age sets (from which a subset is selected for any given
authentication screen) is demonstrated in Figure 8. It can
be seen from this plot that the use of a larger passimage set
reduces the number of attacks required before success when
compared to smaller sets. In each case here, four challenge
screens and eight distractors were used, the variable of
interest (the number of passimages in a set) was varied using
four, eight and twelve.
There is an increase in the number of attacks when
moving between four and eight, eight and twelve and four
and twelve. This indicates that increasing the number of
passimages has a significant effect on the number of attacks
required. The values for minimum, first quartile, median,
mean, third quartile and maximum for each set up is given
in Table III . As expected from the boxplot, it can be seen
from Table III that there is a large jump in all the staistics
between each of the number of passimages.
When applying the Yuen statistic with 20% trimmed
means, the null hypothesis H40 was rejected for each of
the set ups used to test H4 with the test statistic value
ranging between 15.89 and 24.17 and the critical value as
approximately 2.00 in each instance. This is in line with
the results shown in Table III and Figure 8 and means that
there is a significant increase in the nuber of attacks required
before success when the number of passimages in a user’s
Figure 8. H4 Boxplot - Use of a Larger Image Set Boxplot
passimage set is increased.
E. H5 - Increasing the Number of Challenge Screens Results
A summary of the results for the use of larger number
of challenge screens is demonstrated in Figure 9. It can
be seen from this plot that the use of a larger number of
challenge screens appears to reduce the number of attacks
required before success when compared to a smaller number
of screens. In each case, the number of passimages in the set
was kept constant at 10 (since the number of passimages in
the set has to be larger than the number of challenge screens
in each instance) and eight distractors were used, the variable
of interest (the number of challenge screens) was varied
using five, six and eight. The values for minimum, first
quartile, median, mean, third quartile and maximum for each
set up is given in Table III and this also demonstrates the
decrease in number of screens as the median value reduces
in each case.
We can see in the boxplot (Fig. 9) that the median is
consistent when using four and five screens, but as the
number of screens approaches the number of passimages
in the set this reduces, we conjecture that the reason for
this is due to the fact that if the number of passimages
is approximately equal to the number of screens then the
attacker will see the passimages more frequently, making the
attack more successful thus we believe that it is not merely
increasing the number of screens producing this effect, but
having it close to the number of passimages.
When applying the Yuen statistic with 20% trimmed
means, the null hypothesis H50 could be rejected for four
of the five set ups used to test H5. The test statistic value
ranging between 0.29 and 5.87 and the critical value as
approximately 1.99 in each instance. Where the test statistic
was not significant was for the use of five challenge screens,
the remaining results established a significant difference in
the distributions. This is in line with the results shown in
Figure 9. H5 Boxplot - Increased Number of Challenge Screens Boxplot
Table IV
MORE CHALLENGE SCREENS SUMMARY STATS TABLE
No. of
Chal-
lenge
Screens
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Four 5.00 16.00 23.00 24.09 31.00 51.00
Five 9.00 19.00 23.00 23.86 27.00 54.00
Six 8.00 17.00 21.00 20.84 24.00 42.00
Seven 7.00 15.00 18.00 18.27 21.00 29.00
Eight 8.00 15.00 16.00 16.63 19.00 30.00
Table IV and Figure 9, however as seen from the boxplot,
it has a detrimental effect on the number of attacks required
instead of a positive effect (i.e. it decreases the number of
attacks instead of increasing them).
F. H6 - Increasing the Number of Distractors Results
A summary of the results for the use of more distrac-
tors in each challenge set is shown in Figure 10. It can
be seen from this plot that the use of more distractors
in each challenge screen increases the number of attacks
required before success when compared to smaller numbers
of distractors. In each case here, four challenge screens and
four passimages were used, the experimental variable (the
number of distractors per screen) was varied using values
of eight, nine and fifteen. The values for minimum, first
quartile, median, mean, third quartile and maximum for each
set up is given in Table V . As expected from the boxplot
(Figure 10), it can be seen from Table V that there is an
increase in the median values between each of the variations.
There is a larger increase of median attacks before success
between the use of fifteen distractors and eight and nine, this
is as expected as there is a larger difference in the number
of distractors.
When applying the Yuen statistic with 20% trimmed
means, the null hypothesis H60 was rejected for each of
the set ups used to test H6 with the test statistic value
Figure 10. H6 Boxplot - Increased Number of Distractors Boxplot
Table V
INCREASED DISTRACTORS SUMMARY STATS TABLE
No. of
Distrac-
tors
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Eight 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.48 4.00 6.00
Nine 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.91 4.00 7.00
Fifteen 3.00 5.00 6.00 5.64 6.00 8.00
ranging between 3.84 and 13.67 and the critical value
as approximately 1.98 in each instance. This means that
increasing the number of distractors per screen significantly
increases the number of attacks required before success.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we aimed to establish the effective-
ness of different countermeasures against intersection at-
tacks on recognition-based graphical password authenti-
cation mechanisms. This was an important topic to re-
search since alternatives to alphanumerical authentication
are arising more (e.g. Windows 8 is purported to be using
a variation of graphical authentication for logging onto
the system http://blogs.msdn.com/b/b8/archive/2011/12/16/
signing-in-with-a-picture-password.aspx) but analysis of se-
curity can be limited where recognition-based mechanisms
are considered.
One attack which was often discussed (e.g. [3], [4]) but
has until now remained a theoretical discussion is that of
intersection attacks. Due to the lack of “real world” data
on the use of recognition-based graphical passwords, a
simulation approach was taken. We simulated the results of
attacking a recognition-based system where different coun-
termeasures were implemented and analysed the significance
of differences in the number of attacks which would have
to be performed before an account was compromised.
We have shown that whilst some of the previously iden-
tified countermeasures have a significant impact on the
number of attacks before an attacker would be successful,
others cannot claim to have such an effect. In particular,
the use of dummy screens (where only distractor images are
shown if the user selects the incorrect image on any given
challenge screen within a session) did not show significant
results. Another approach which showed significant results,
but decreased the number of attacks before success instead
of increasing them, was that of increasing the number of
challenge screens presented to the user to authenticate. It is
our recommendation that if a recognition-based scheme were
to be implemented (where the programmer is concerned
about interference challenge screens are kept constant or is
not willing to implement such a measure as it would be
excessive given the context of authentication) that dummy
screens are not used and the number of challenge screens
required for a sessions should not be close the the number
of passimages.
Of the methods which achieved significant increases in the
number of attacks before success, increasing the number of
distractors per screen and the passimage set size and using a
subset of constant distractors provide effective results. The
most effective countermeasure was established as using a
number of constant distractors per passimage. When com-
paring the median number of attacks before success to the
control configuration (with four passimages, four challenge
screens and eight distractors) using one constant distractor
per passimage resulted in an approximate 5.17 times in-
crease, using two resulted in an approximate 20.17 times
increase and using three resulted in an approximate 57.17
times increase The second most successful countermeasure
was using a larger passimage set, which when compared to
a control of four passimages, six gave approximately 2.67
times increase, eight gave approximately 4.5 times increase
and twelve gave an approximate increase of 16 times. The
least effective of the significant countermeasures was using
more distractors per screen, which when nine distractors
was compared to eight resulted in approximately 1.3 times
increase and fifteen resulted in a 2 times increase.
Possible future work includes the potential for establishing
optimal values for each countermeasure. Another next step
in this research is to continue to construct simulations in
order to produce a model of the security of recognition-
based graphical password schemes. This could then be used
to compare any two recognition-based schemes and also to
establish the countermeasures required to reflect the level of
security needed for a chosen context.
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